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ABI Layer 5: end-to-end soundness capstone certificate#36

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hyperpolymath merged 5 commits into
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claude/new-session-znxgm7
Jun 28, 2026
Merged

ABI Layer 5: end-to-end soundness capstone certificate#36
hyperpolymath merged 5 commits into
mainfrom
claude/new-session-znxgm7

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Summary

Layer 5 (the capstone, completing the 5-layer proof track): a new *.ABI.Capstone module importing every prior layer and assembling a single inhabited ABISound certificate (abiContractDischarged) from the real exported witnesses of the flagship property (L2 forbidden-never-permitted), the deeper invariant (L3 monotone safety), and the FFI-seam injectivity (L4). One end-to-end soundness statement.

Genuine composition only — reuses real exported names.

Testing

Idris2 0.7.0 --build → exit 0, zero warnings. Adversarial: a bogus-field certificate was rejected. build/ removed. No believe_me/postulate/sorry.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_01A6PSzJWpRxtzGDjUCEh7Mx


Generated by Claude Code

claude added 4 commits June 27, 2026 19:48
Raises the Phronesiser Idris2 ABI to Layer 2 with a flagship, machine-checked
semantic proof of the repo's headline property ("provably safe ethical
constraints for AI agents").

Model: a deontic policy partitions agent actions into Allow/Deny. The
`ActionPermitted` proposition has NO constructor admitting a `Deny` verdict, so
a forbidden action is structurally uncertifiable.

Proven:
- decActionPermitted: sound + complete `Dec (ActionPermitted a)`.
- certifyPermittedSound: certifier soundness (Ok => ActionPermitted).
- safeInformPermitted: positive control (inhabited permission witness).
- forbiddenNeverPermitted: negative control / core safety theorem
  `Not (ActionPermitted forbiddenDeploy)`.
- forbiddenNeverCertifiedOk: corollary that the forbidden action is never Ok.

Non-vacuity confirmed: a deliberately false witness
`PermitAllow Refl : ActionPermitted forbiddenDeploy` is rejected by idris2
(Allow vs Deny mismatch). Build is clean (exit 0, zero warnings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A6PSzJWpRxtzGDjUCEh7Mx
New module Phronesiser.ABI.Invariants, built over the existing Layer-2
Semantics model (Action / Verdict / verdictOf — nothing redefined). It
proves two properties strictly deeper than the Layer-2 single-action
safety theorem, both quantified over all actions and over policies:

  1. Monotone safety (downward-closure of permission): if policy p2
     tightens p1, every action p1 forbids stays forbidden under p2 —
     tightening never re-permits a previously-forbidden action; the
     permitted set only shrinks. Tightening is a proven preorder
     (reflexive + transitive).
  2. Conjunction composition: an action permitted under andPolicy p1 p2
     is permitted under each conjunct (iff via bothPermitsAnd), and the
     conjunction provably tightens each conjunct.

Includes a sound+complete Dec (Permits p a), sample policies over the
shared model, positive controls (witnesses + a live application of the
monotone-safety theorem) and negative/non-vacuity controls in Not(...)
form. %default total; no believe_me / postulate / assert_total / sorry /
asserted equalities. Builds with zero warnings; an adversarial false
proof (tightened policy permits the forbidden action) is rejected by the
type checker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A6PSzJWpRxtzGDjUCEh7Mx
Prove the FFI result-code encoding is SOUND, not just structurally
agreed (the abi-ffi-gate.py check): distinct ABI outcomes never collide
on the wire, and the C integer faithfully round-trips back.

New module Phronesiser.ABI.FfiSeam (imports Phronesiser.ABI.Types):
- intToResult decoder + resultRoundTrip (left inverse of resultToInt)
- resultToIntInjective derived from the round-trip via justInj + cong
- same round-trip + injectivity for modalityToInt (DeonticModality)
  and severityToInt (HarmSeverity); no ProofStatus/statusToInt exists
- positive controls (concrete decode = Refl) and non-vacuity controls
  (distinct codes have distinct ints, machine-checked)

Genuine proof only: no believe_me/idris_crash/assert_total/postulate.
%default total, SPDX header, zero warnings. abi package builds clean;
an adversarial false claim (resultToInt Ok = resultToInt Error) is
rejected by the type checker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A6PSzJWpRxtzGDjUCEh7Mx
Assemble the existing Layer-2/3/4 proofs into one inhabited certificate
record (ABISound) and value (abiContractDischarged) in
Phronesiser.ABI.Capstone, tying the flagship safety property, the
monotone-safety invariant, and the FFI-seam injectivity into one
end-to-end soundness statement. Reuses only already-exported witnesses
(safeInformPermitted, noHarmTightensBase, forbiddenStaysForbidden,
resultToIntInjective). No new axioms; %default total; zero warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A6PSzJWpRxtzGDjUCEh7Mx
@hyperpolymath hyperpolymath marked this pull request as ready for review June 28, 2026 07:25
Signed-off-by: Jonathan D.A. Jewell <6759885+hyperpolymath@users.noreply.github.com>
@hyperpolymath hyperpolymath merged commit c97ba30 into main Jun 28, 2026
22 of 24 checks passed
@hyperpolymath hyperpolymath deleted the claude/new-session-znxgm7 branch June 28, 2026 07:30
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2 participants