test(auths-crypto): measure that secret comparison is constant-time#347
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The constant-time lint proves ct_eq is called; it cannot prove the compiled comparison runs in input-independent time. Add a dudect-style Welch t-test that times the comparison across two input classes (input matches the secret vs differs in the first byte). A naive early-return byte compare is the negative control the harness must flag as leaky (it measures |t|~thousands); the production subtle::ct_eq must show none (|t|~single digits). Batched, black-box'd, outlier-trimmed, median over rounds for stability. Auths-Id: did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd Auths-Device: did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd Auths-Anchor-Seq: 1
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Auths Commit Verification
Result: ❌ 0/1 commits verified How to fixCommit 1. Install auths macOS: 2. One-time setup (creates your identity and configures Git) auths init3. Sign this branch and push auths sign origin/main..HEAD
git push --force-with-leaseFor CI to verify the signer, commit an identity bundle: auths id export-bundle --alias main --output .auths/ci-bundle.json --max-age-secs 31536000 |
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The constant-time lint proves ct_eq is called; it cannot prove the compiled
comparison runs in input-independent time. Add a dudect-style Welch t-test
that times the comparison across two input classes (input matches the secret
vs differs in the first byte). A naive early-return byte compare is the
negative control the harness must flag as leaky (it measures |t|~thousands);
the production subtle::ct_eq must show none (|t|~single digits). Batched,
black-box'd, outlier-trimmed, median over rounds for stability.
Auths-Id: did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd
Auths-Device: did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd
Auths-Anchor-Seq: 1